Never Let Your Sense of Morals Keep You From Doing What\u27s Right: Using Newly Dead Bodies as Educational Resources by Moore, Dale L.
Health Matrix: The Journal of Law-
Medicine
Volume 18 | Issue 1
2008
Never Let Your Sense of Morals Keep You From
Doing What's Right: Using Newly Dead Bodies as
Educational Resources
Dale L. Moore
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/healthmatrix
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Health Matrix: The Journal of Law-Medicine by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Dale L. Moore, Never Let Your Sense of Morals Keep You From Doing What's Right: Using Newly Dead Bodies as Educational Resources, 18
Health Matrix 105 (2008)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/healthmatrix/vol18/iss1/5
NEVER LET YOUR SENSE OF MORALS
KEEP YOU FROM DOING WHAT'S




"I take it to be self evident that there can be no experienced phy-
sicians unless, at some point, procedures are done by inexperienced
persons. The question, therefore, is not whether students should use
patients for practice, but under what guidelines. ,
INTRODUCTION
A. A Scenario to Consider
Paramedics transported a sixty-year-old man who was experienc-
ing crushing chest pain to the emergency room at University Hospital.
Shortly thereafter the patient's cardiac and respiratory function
ceased on account of the massive heart attack that caused his chest
pain. The emergency-room team administered standard resuscitation
measures, including endotracheal intubation, the insertion of a tube
into his windpipe to establish an airway; assisted ventilation, the
pressurized delivery of air to his lungs via the endotracheal tube to
enable oxygenation of his vital organs; and insertion of a central in-
travenous line, the placement of a catheter into a large vein near his
clavicle for delivery of fluids and medications. Despite vigorous ef-
fort, the team was unable to restore the patient's heart or lung func-
tion. About an hour after the patient's arrival at the emergency room,
the physician leading the resuscitation team pronounced him dead.
Two of the health-care professionals who observed these events
are continuing their formal educations. The first, a registered nurse,
aspires to become a Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetist
("C.R.N.A. "), and to that end is pursuing a master's degree in the
t Professor of Law, Albany Law School; Adjunct Professor, Albany Medi-
cal College.1 Earl E. Shelp & Norman Fost, Case Study: Practicing Procedures on
Dying Children, 10 HASTINGS CTR. REP., August 1980, at 11, 12.
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University's nurse anesthesiology program. While earning the de-
gree, and after completing the program, the nurse will regularly per-
form endotracheal intubation. The second professional, a medical
doctor, aspires to become board certified in emergency medicine, and
to that end has recently begun a multi-year emergency-medicine resi-
dency program at University Hospital. During the residency and af-
ter its completion, the physician will frequently be called on to insert
central intravenous catheters. Both professionals will perform these
procedures on patients who are in extremis, when time is of the es-
sence; confidence and skill will be critical to their success. At this
point, however, these health-care professionals are novices. Both
have observed others performing these procedures but neither has
performed them herself Is it appropriate for them to spend a few
minutes practicing these two essential procedures on a newly dead
body in the emergency room?
B. Brief Analysis of the Question Presented
The last decade has seen a fair amount of commentary2 reconsid-
ering a long-standing aspect of the education of health-care profes-
sionals: the use of newly dead bodies to teach novice professionals to
perform medical procedures. 3 Several medical professional organiza-
tions have lately condemned this practice, at least when it occurs
without the express consent of the decedent, or his next-of-kin.4
2 E.g., The Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs of the Am. Med. Ass'n,
Performing Procedures on the Newly Deceased, 77 ACAD. MED. 1212 (2002) [herein-
after AMA Council]; Mark W. Fourre, The Performance of Procedures on the Re-
cently Deceased, 9 AcAD. EMERGENCY MED. 595 (2002); Kenneth V. Iserson, Post-
mortem Procedures in the Emergency Department: Using the Recently Dead to Prac-
tise and Teach, 19 J. MED. ETmics 92 (1993); Kenneth V. Iserson, Teaching Without
Harming the Living: Performing Minimally Invasive Procedures on the Newly Dead,
8 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 216 (2005) [hereinafter Iserson, Teaching Without
Harmingl; Alice Fleury Kerns, Comment, Better to Lay It Out on the Table Rather
Than Do It Behind the Curtain: Hospitals Need to Obtain Consent Before Using
Newly Deceased Patients to Teach Resuscitation Procedures, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH
L. & POL'Y, 581 (1997); Rumm M. Morag et al., Performing Procedures on the
Newly Deceased for Teaching Purposes: What If We Were To Ask?, 165 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 92 (2005); Kathleen S. Oman, John David Armstrong II & Martha
Stoner, Perspectives on Practicing Procedures on the Newly Dead, 9 ACAD.
EMERGENCY MED. 786 (2002); Terri A. Schmidt et al., Ethics Seminars: The Ethical
Debate on Practicing Procedures on the Newly Dead, 11 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED.
962 (2004); Daniel Sperling, Breaking Through the Silence: Illegality of Performing
Resuscitation Procedures on the "Newly Dead," 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 393 (2004).
3 Iserson, Teaching Without Harming, supra note 2, at 219 ("Many genera-
tions of physicians have learned and practiced lifesaving procedures in this manner.").
4 See Bd. of Dirs., Soc'y for Academic Emergency Med., The Society for
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Commentary from the legal community, although less voluminous,
concurs in the condemnation, which appears to derive from a belief
that that such nonconsensual educational activities are illegal. The
potential bases for this belief would necessarily be 1) statutes, regula-
tions, or other affirmative statements from sources authorized to de-
fine what is legal in this realm, or 2) case law stating that participants
in these activities expose themselves to risks of civil liability, profes-
sional discipline, or criminal prosecution. Analysis of such potential
bases, however, shows their insubstantiality.
Accordingly, in this article, I urge critics to reconsider their con-
clusions. Educational activities contemplated in the scenario above
are not illegal, nor should they be made so. Until inventors create
synthetic devices whose educational value equals that of newly dead
bodies, we should encourage rather than condemn use of a unique
resource that can no longer be helped or harmed.
Part I of this article reviews the background of this problem, ex-
plaining who cares about it, and why. Part II identifies flaws in the
arguments advanced by proponents of a consent requirement and pre-
sents another perspective on the legal issues. Essentially, Part II ex-
plains why these educational activities are not presently illegal. Part
III then makes the case for encouraging the activities, suggesting an
approach limited to the emergency-care context, and setting forth the
supporting legal analysis.
I. WHO CARES, AND WHY?
A. The Educational Use of Newly Dead Bodies
Aside from living human beings, newly dead bodies present the
most realistic models available for allowing novices to acquire the
skills they need to perform certain invasive procedures. Other poten-
tial models, such as animals, embalmed cadavers, and mannequins, do
not provide suitable surrogates. 5 Only an unembalmed human body
Academic Emergency Medicine Position on Procedures on the Newly Dead, 1
AcAD. EMERGENCY MED. 967, 967 (2004) (explaining the problems associated with
performing these procedures without consent); AMA Council, supra note 2, at 1212-
13; Lois Snyder & Cathy Leffler, Ethics Manual, 142 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 560,
575 (2005) (functioning as a position paper for the Ethics and Human Rights Com-
mittee of the American College of Physicians); Schmidt et al., supra note 2
(discussing approaches of some "major medical associations").
5 Animal models may be less available than, and too dissimilar to, human
bodies. Embalmed human cadavers lack the body fluids and lifelike qualities needed
for realistic experiences. To the extent that they are available at all, mannequins and
virtual reality programs are too expensive to be feasible for widespread use. Soc'y
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that has not yet developed rigor mortis, the "stiffness of death," will
do. Accordingly, for each professional who must learn these proce-
dures, her first human subject will present a unique challenge. Should
that first human subject be a living person, or a newly dead body? Put
another way, should the valuable potential resource of a newly dead
body go to waste or be put to good use?
Taking advantage of the opportunity to use a newly dead body to
introduce a novice to techniques essential to her professional skills has
been part of the world of medical education for many years.6 The
activities involved are minimally invasive,7 if invasive at all, and of
short duration. They cause no harm, they do not change the appear-
ance of the corpse, and they do not interfere with bereavement or bur-
ial. Nonetheless, physicians and other health-care providers, as well
as the organizations representing them, have raised questions about
the legitimacy of such educational activities. The questions betray
concern, perhaps even fear, about the consequences that could stem
from these activities. Whether the potential consequences most feared
involve professional liability, unpleasant publicity, or regulatory back-
lash is unclear. What appears quite clear, however, is that the reas-
sessment summarized in recent commentaries has been driven in large
part by a sense that there is something "wrong," or "bad" about these
activities. Among the commentators from the professional medical
community, the persuasive voice expressing a different view is that of
a physician, Kenneth V. Iserson,8 whose clinical specialties are in
emergency medicine and bioethics. He is virtually alone in rejecting
the conclusion that a longstanding educational practice should be re-
evaluated, and now determined a "bad" thing.
Commentary from the legal community has been comparatively
sparse thus far and is best characterized as conclusory, 9 or if more
for Academic Emergency Med., supra note 4. See also Richard K. Reznick & Helen
MacRae, Teaching Surgical Skills - Changes in the Wind, 355 NEw ENG. J. MED.
2664, 2666-67, tbl. 2 (explaining that disadvantages of various simulation tools in-
clude anatomical differences [animals], compliance of tissues [human cadavers],
limited technical applications [human performance simulators], and poor simulation
of three dimensions [virtual reality simulators]; and that in general, "the higher the
fidelity and the more realistic the model, the more expensive the training tool").
6 Iserson, Teaching Without Harming, supra note 2, at 219; my personal
observations during a decade of critical-care experience as a registered nurse.
7 The characterization is Iserson's. See Iserson, Teaching Without Harming,
supra note 2, at 216.
8 Iserson is a Professor of Emergency Medicine and Director of the Arizona
Bioethics Program at the University of Arizona College of Medicine in Tucson.
9 See, e.g., Snyder & Leffler, supra note 4.
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elaborate, not particularly persuasive.10 In general, it echoes the con-
cerns raised by the medical-professional community, and condemns
educational activities of the sort described above as, at least poten-
tially, if not actually illegal. 1' In this article, I beg to disagree.
Although commentators from the medical community, whose
writings are more substantial in quantity and analysis than those of the
lawyers, have called for change, they have stopped short of suggesting
complete abandonment of the educational opportunity afforded by a
newly dead body. Instead, they urge the adoption of guidelines pre-
cluding educational use of newly dead bodies in the absence of ex-
press consent. 12 Requiring express consent, however, could so sub-
stantially reduce the availability of this resource as to effectively
eliminate it.
B.An Ironic Contrast
Commentators' apparent fascination with questions about the pro-
priety of using newly dead bodies for teaching is both disproportion-
ate and ironic, given the relative dearth of attention to a much more
problematic aspect of professional education: the use of living human
beings as the pioneer victims for novices' training.1 3 A living patient
about to become the subject of a resident physician's first attempt to
insert a central intravenous line may not be told of the physician's
lack of experience, let alone be given the opportunity to refuse her
attentions in favor of a more proficient substitute's. This is not be-
cause the patient's family will have been asked to act as his surrogate.
Rather, it is because no one will have been asked for specific consent
to use this living patient as a pioneer victim. A focus on belabored
discussion of a less troubling custom distracts our attention from the
lack of emphasis on a more questionable one. 14
10 See, e.g., Sperling, supra note 2; Kerns, supra note 2.
1 See supra notes 9-10.
12 AMA Council, supra note 2, at 1215.
13 For a timely discussion of the problematic aspects of this practice, see
Winston Chiong, Justifying Patient Risks Associated with Medical Education, 298 J.
AM. MED. ASS'N 1046 (2007).
14 The custom is questionable in part because of the potential for bad out-
comes, as illustrated by courts' opinions describing the bad outcomes achieved when
novice, or otherwise inexperienced professionals performed procedures on living
patients. See, e.g., Mullins v. Parkview Hosp., Inc., 830 N.E.2d 45, 50-51 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2005), affd in part & vacated in part, 865 N.E.2d 608 (Ind. 2007) (The hospi-
tal-defendant permitted an E.M.T. student, who was pursuing a certification program,
to practice her first human intubation on a patient who was under anesthesia for a
hysterectomy. The student lacerated the patient's esophagus during two unsuccessful
attempts to intubate the patient.); Richard v. Colomb, 916 So. 2d 1122, 1125 (La. Ct.
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II. A TREND IN THE WRONG DIRECTION; CONSENT
IS BESIDE THE POINT
Authority to establish a legal requirement that hospitals obtain ex-
press consent resides in familiar places: legislatures and administra-
tive agencies, acting prospectively by creating statutes or regulations
to this effect, and courts acting retrospectively, by imposing liability
on those who have failed to obtain consent. These familiar entities
have not created such rules in this area, however, so those who believe
that consent is, or should be required, must draw on other sources or
lines of reasoning.
Ostensible bases for requiring consent include: analogy to the
rules governing other matters, such as the procurement of organs from
cadavers; concern about interfering with the rights and interests of
decedents' loved ones; and a rather uneasy and guarded intimation
App. 2005) (After surgery to remove a patient's gall bladder was "essentially com-
plete," a physician member of the surgical team "took a stitch on otherwise healthy
fatty tissue solely for the purpose of practicing his technique. ... [S]titching was not a
necessary technique or part of the operation .... " The needle was "lost" when the
surgeon took the stitch.); Felice v. Valleylab, Inc., 520 So. 2d 920, 923 (La. Ct. App.
1987) (A first-year resident performed a circumcision under supervision of a third-
year resident using an electric cautery device that neither resident had been trained to
use for circumcision surgery and that, in fact, was not customarily used for such sur-
gery. Excessive electrical current from the device burned the child's penis severely,
ultimately leaving him with no visible penile tissue.); Dingle v. Belin, 749 A.2d 157,
159 (Md. 2000) (A resident mistakenly clipped and dissected a common bile duct
rather than a cystic bile duct when assisting with a laparoscopic cholecystectomy,
causing "a great deal of pain" and a "need for extensive corrective surgery" at an-
other hospital.); Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 499 (Wis. 1996) (Surgery
to clip a large basilar bifurcation brain aneurysm resulted in permanent neurological
impairment. The surgeon had "relatively limited experience" with aneurysm surgery
and virtually all of that experience was limited to the less complicated procedure to
clip an anterior aneurysm.).
Furthermore, the custom of using living patients as "pioneers" is question-
able because it is ethically problematic even in the absence of bad outcomes. See,
e.g., Jennifer Goedken, Pelvic Examinations Under Anesthesia: An Important Teach-
ing Tool, 8 J. HEALTH CARE L.& POL'Y 232 (2005); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Auton-
omy Suspended: Using Female Patients to Teach Intimate Exams Without Their
Knowledge or Consent, 8 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 240 (2005); see generally Janet
L. Dolgin, The Evolution of the "Patient": Shifts in Attitudes About Consent, Genetic
Information, and Commercialization in Health Care, 34 HOFSTRA L. REv. 137, 159-
64 (2005) (discussing the importance of a physician's disclosure of his or her relative
lack of experience in performing a particular procedure when obtaining a patient's
"informed" consent to undergo that procedure at the hands of the relatively inexperi-
enced physician).
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that an individual's autonomy interest may survive his death, at least
to some degree.
15
The rationales accompanying the discussion by proponents of the
consent requirement fail, however, to support the conclusion that the
law requires express consent. First, statutes enacted to govern other
matters do not speak to this issue, and interpretations that distort those
statutes are not persuasive. 16 Second, the legitimate concerns of inter-
ested parties receive sufficient protection without adding a consent
requirement. Third, the courts' analyses of autonomy principles in
treatment-refusal cases support the conclusion not only that consent is
unnecessary, but also that refusal of consent may be ignored.
1 7
A. Analogies to the Law Governing Related Issues
Analogies to the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act are inapt. Using a
newly dead body for a brief teaching opportunity that takes nothing
from the body and leaves its appearance unchanged is fundamentally
different from harvesting body parts for transplantation. The physical
invasion, if an invasion at all, is minimal, the procedure may well
have already been performed during resuscitation efforts, and the du-
ration is brief. By contrast, one may not procure transplantable organs
15 The consent proponents also mention their concern about undermining
public trust in the medical profession. Since this concern does not give rise to dis-
crete legal issues, I will explore it only to the extent it bears on the other points. A
generalized concern about trust in the profession may stem from disapproval of any
practice that even hints at disrespect for patients. For example, coping mechanisms
that use gallows humor, which strike some as merely innocuous or irreverent, may
lead others to conclude that the humor is crude and connotes disrespect for vulnerable
patients. For an example of the use of gallows humor to cope with stressful situa-
tions, see SAMUEL SHEM, THE HOUSE OF GOD (1978) (describing a fictionalized ac-
count of the experiences of house staff in a teaching hospital). For a discussion of the
objectionable implications of such coping mechanisms, see WARD ETHncs: DILEMMAS
FOR MEDICAL STUDENTS AND DOCTORS IN TRAINING 154-70 (Thomasine K. Kushner
& David C. Thomasma eds., 2001).
16 Although proponents from the medical community frame their remarks
primarily in terms of "ethical" standards rather than legal principles, they invoke legal
authorities such as the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act to support their position. See,
e.g., AMA Council, supra note 2, at 1213 & 1216 n.17 (citing A. M. Sadler et al., The
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act: A Model for Reform, 206 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2501
(1968)) (explaining that the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act implies that family mem-
bers of a recently deceased patient have "a legally recognized interest in how the
remains of the body are to be treated"). Moreover, given the importance of industry
custom in setting professional standards of care, expressions purporting to state a
professional consensus will inevitably inform and influence legal analysis and reason-
ing.
17 That is, no one in the eligible population may "opt out." See infra note 46
and accompanying text.
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without a physical invasion involving a procedure outside the scope of
any treatment effort. Something must be "taken" from the body, an
event absent from the teaching scenario.' 8 In addition, characterizing
post-mortem intubation, venipuncture, or even pericardiocentesis as
''mutilation" or "unauthorized autopsy" would constitute not only
poor diction but also an unsupportable factual conclusion.19
B. Potential Interference with the Rights and Interests of Decedents'
Loved Ones
1. Legitimate Interests of Loved Ones
Prior to death, the physician owes a duty of care to the decedent,
not his loved ones. This is true even in cases where loved ones must
speak for a patient incapable of expressing his own wishes about
treatment decisions. 20 The physician's duty expires with the decedent;
it does not migrate to his loved ones. The interests of loved ones are
independent, and although entitled to respect, are neither unlimited
nor absolute. Nor are they in jeopardy. Making use of the educa-
tional opportunity offered by a newly dead body will not impair the
legitimate interests of the decedent's loved ones, which, I contend, are
limited to timely notification of the death, prompt opportunity to visit
the decedent and view the remains, and unimpeded ability to take cus-
tody of the decedent's body for burial and bereavement rituals.
Loved ones' legitimate interests do not include a property right in the
decedent's remains,21 or a right to deprive future patients of access to
skilled professionals by thwarting a critical educational mission.
18 "Procurement" and "harvesting," two terms used to characterize the
obtaining of organs for transplantation, suggest their own meanings.
19 Reactions to body snatching and grave robbing have been driven by
activities entirely distinct from those described here. For descriptions of body-
snatching activities, see MARY ROACH, STIFF: THE CURIOUS LivEs OF HUMAN
CADAVERS 37-57 (2003). For a fictionalized account of the gruesome practices of
"resurrectionists," see TESS GERRrrSEN, THE BONE GARDEN (2007).
20 For an especially poignant statement of this view, see John J. Paris, Robert
K. Crone & Frank Reardon, Physicians' Refusal of Requested Treatment: The Case of
Baby L, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1012 (1990).
21 See infra notes 22-23 & accompanying text. Cases in which liability ques-
tions of "unauthorized autopsy" arise are not implicated here. No one is making
grotesque Y-shaped incisions through the chest and abdomen, or peeling away a
scalp, or removing organs in part or whole.
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2. Civil Liability Claims
Legal duties owed the decedent during life die along with him.
His dead body cannot be the victim of battery, malpractice, or any
other intentional or negligent tort. Potential claims based on educa-
tional use of the decedent's body, therefore, must be predicated on
tortious behavior toward his survivors. And although the question
whether a survivor owns a property interest in a corpse is sometimes
explored, the essence of survivors' potential claims is personal in-
jury, not property damage. Courts occasionally quote Professor
Prosser on this point:
[In such cases], the courts have talked of a somewhat dubious
"property right" to the body, usually in the next of kin, which
did not exist while the decedent was living, cannot be con-
veyed, can be used only for the one purpose of burial, and not
only has no pecuniary value but is a source of liability for fu-
neral expenses. It seems reasonably obvious that such "prop-
erty" is something evolved out of thin air to meet the occa-
sion, and that it is in reality the personal feelings of the survi-
vors which are being protected, under a fiction likely to de-
ceive no one but a lawyer.23
Whether categorized as unauthorized autopsy, or negligent mis-
handling of a corpse, the cases that might be germane basically boil
down to claims that post-mortem wrongful conduct aggravated the
emotional distress experienced by grieving survivors.24 Accordingly,
the appropriate question is whether educational use of a newly dead
body is tantamount to actionable infliction of emotional distress to his
survivors.
22 To the extent that a debate over the existence and scope of a survivor's
"quasi-property right" in a decedent's body remains alive, it is beyond the scope of
this article. Courts willing to entertain the possibility that such a right exists have
made clear that human remains are of no financial value and have acknowledged that
the real damage, if any, is to the feelings of the survivors. See Bauer v. N. Fulton
Med. Ctr., 527 S.E.2d 240, 245 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999); Colavito v. New York Organ
Donor Network, 860 N.E.2d 713, 719 n.8 (N.Y. 2006).
23 5 PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 63 (W. Page Keeton ed.,
5th ed. 1984). Pertinent portions of this quote were quoted in Bauer and Colavito,
supra note 22.
24 The so-called "bystander" cases are not relevant to this analysis. They
deal with injuries that bystander-witnesses sustain on account of their observations of
negligently caused injuries to their loved ones. See infra note 28.
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a. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (lED) Claims
The stumbling blocks that stand in the way of an RED claim's
success are the requirements that a plaintiff prove both outrageous
conduct and intent, two elements of an lIED plaintiff's prima facie
case. Although satisfying the legal standard for proof of intent may
be difficult,25 the former of these two obstacles is the more formida-
ble. Since recognizing the HED tort claim, 26 courts have used a de-
manding definition of outrageousness, thereby keeping a tight rein on
the expansion of this tort. To be outrageous, conduct must be truly
indecent, shocking to the conscience, intolerable in a civilized society
- "behavior that is so obnoxious, rude and gratuitously cruel as to go
beyond all possible bounds of decency. 2 7 The "outrage" standard
makes getting a case to the jury, which the conventional wisdom iden-
tifies as a tort plaintiffs goal, dauntingly challenging. Given this his-
tory, the idea that courts would be willing to treat a widespread, rou-
tine practice as potentially outrageous is simply not plausible.
b. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (NIED)
Plaintiffs pursuing emotional distress claims based on a negli-
gence theory also confront difficult, albeit somewhat different chal-
lenges. Like RED plaintiffs, NIED plaintiffs must overcome courts'
general reluctance to expand the scope of tort claims allowing com-
pensation for purely emotional harm. For NIED plaintiffs, the doc-
trinal demands of a negligence theory, described below, augment the
policy-based hesitation.
The first problematic aspect of an NEID claim lies in establishing
the existence of a relationship on which the plaintiff might predicate a
legal duty. The physician-patient relationship, which certainly gives
rise to a legal duty, is limited to its parties and does not include survi-
vors. On the occasions when courts have concluded that an existing
physician-patient relationship imposed on the physician a duty to a
third party, the third party has been at a foreseeable risk of personal
injury due to the patient's ill-health, whether physical or mental. The
educational practices under consideration here, however, create no
25 The plaintiff must show that the defendant intended to cause severe emo-
tional distress or, at the very least, recklessly disregarded the likelihood that his or her
conduct would cause severe emotional distress. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
46 (1965).
26 The earliest cases to recognize the claim were decided in the middle of the
twentieth century. See, e.g., State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d
282, 285-86 (Cal. 1952).
27 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS § 1.8, at 18 (1999).
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risks to third parties. Indeed, no actions at all need be directed to-
28ward third parties.
In the unlikely event that a newly dead body's survivor is able to
establish duty, he will face the second demand of negligence doctrine:
proof that the defendant breached that duty by failing to take reason-
able care for the survivor's protection. Courts routinely defer to pro-
fessional customs when they measure the reasonableness of health-
care providers' behavior; in addition, given the complete absence of
risk to a survivor, or any third party, the most appropriate question
would be "Where's the breach?
' 29
Finally, negligence law includes proof of damages as one criterion
for establishing liability. Although proof of emotional harm will
sometimes satisfy this criterion, it is by no means certain to be suffi-
cient.
3. Other Forms of Liability
Survivors' complaints may provoke the initiation of professional
disciplinary proceedings or criminal prosecutions. Such actions, pur-
sued in the name, and on the behalf, of the public, do not result in
damage awards for private parties. Rather, they protect the general
public by imposing penalties such as license revocation or incarcera-
tion of health-care providers whose behavior imperils public health
and welfare. Bad behavior alone, even in the absence of an injury
caused by that behavior, can trigger successful criminal or disciplinary
actions. This characteristic distinguishes these types of actions from
tort actions brought by private parties, who must show behavior plus
28 This characteristic distinguishes these educational practices from the facts
of cases such as Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 616 P.2d 813, 817 (Cal.
1980) (illustrating a situation where defendant undertook and breached a duty of
reasonable care to plaintiff-husband by negligently misdiagnosing his wife as suffer-
ing from syphilis), and Johnson v. State, 334 N.E.2d 590, 593 (N.Y. 1975) (describ-
ing an instance where a hospital assumed and breached a duty of reasonable care to a
patient's daughter by informing the daughter that her mother, who was in fact alive
and well, had died). Moreover, the absence of contemporaneous observation or
awareness of harm sustained by a living loved one distinguishes these educational
practices from the facts of "bystander" cases, such as Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912,
925 (Cal. 1968) (holding that a mother who witnessed the negligently caused death of
her child was entitled to pursue damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress
from defendant driver).
29 The negligence state-of-mind criterion - that emotional distress should
have been foreseeable to the reasonably prudent person in the defendant's position -
may be easier to establish than an intent to cause emotional distress (or recklessness
with regard to its occurring). Foreseeability of a potential outcome, however, while
necessary to a finding of liability, is by no means sufficient.
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actual harm in order to prevail. Accordingly, in the criminal prosecu-
tion and professional disciplinary realms, authorities may target po-
tentially harmful, as well as actually harmful behavior. For example,
a professional who practices while impaired by alcohol or drugs may
be prosecuted, or disciplined, even if she was sufficiently fortunate to
have avoided injuring a patient during the period of impairment. The
somewhat broader potential scope of actions brought to protect the
public interest, however, should not extend to this field. Educational
practices, the intent and impact of which produce only a benefit to the
public, ought not to be scrutinized, or punished via disciplinary or
criminal proceedings.3 °
C. Autonomy after Death?
1. Does Autonomy Survive Death?
That individual autonomy survives death, or survives death to an
extent sufficient to make autonomy an important factor in this debate,
is doubtful. Moreover, allowing the autonomy mantra to drive the
results of this discussion is ill advised. But, assuming for the sake of
argument that some fragment of the autonomy interest of "[e]very
human being of adult years and sound mind" 31 lingers after his death,
this fragment cannot possibly be more substantial than the autonomy
interest possessed by the living ancestor of the newly dead body. And
as virtually every court to discuss the issue has reminded us, a living
individual's interest in autonomy is by no means absolute.32 Courts
regularly balance the individual interest in autonomy against various
societal interests, including those of other living people.33 In so do-
ing, courts acknowledge the possibility that societal interests may
outweigh individual rights. Accordingly, should we reach the ques-
tionable conclusion that an autonomy interest inhering in a newly
30 Criticism aimed at disciplinary authorities suggests that they are more than
fully occupied with attempts to prevent potential harm to living patients. See SIDNEY
M. WOLFE ET AL., PUBLIC CITIZEN'S HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP RANKING OF THE RATE
OF STATE MEDICAL BOARDs' SERIOUS DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS, 2004-2006 (2007)
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7525.
31 Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914); see
also In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 70-71 (N.Y. 1981) (finding that an unconscious
patient's autonomy interest is preserved).
32 This is true whether the individual's decision-making capacity is intact,
questionable, or absent at the relevant time.
33 For example, living people may include innocent third parties, such as
children of a parent who refuses life-saving medical treatment, or people at risk of
injury because of the behavior of a mentally ill individual who is dangerous.
[Vol. 18:105
2008] USING NEWLY DEAD BODIES AS EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES 117
dead body is germane to this discussion, the only deference due that
interest is to assess its weight relative to the communal and societal
interests courts routinely consider when they determine the fates of
living individuals. 34 Of those societal interests, three appear particu-
larly relevant here: (1) preserving life, (2) protecting third parties, and
(3) safeguarding the ethical integrity of the medical profession.35
2. The Balancing Test Applied
Assume that autonomy survives death, and that the newly dead
individual had previously declined to have his body serve as an educa-
tional resource. An application of the existing balancing test readily
produces sufficient support for overriding his wishes because greater
weight lies on the side of the relevant societal interests. The societal
interest in preserving life, which, not surprisingly, almost always
counters the individual autonomy interest in the treatment-refusal
cases that spawned this balancing test, similarly weighs against auton-36
omy here. The societal interest in preserving life can be furthered
only by using, and not at all by abandoning, the educational opportu-
nity afforded by a newly dead body. No life remains to be preserved
in the newly dead body, but the preservation of life in general may be
fostered, and certainly will not be hindered by taking advantage of the
opportunity.
Exploration of the societal interest in protecting third parties
commonly occurs in cases in which an "innocent" minor child may be
left orphaned if medical professionals or the courts honor a parent's
rejection of medical recommendations. But the law must also attend
to other situations in which an individual's exercise of autonomy puts
third parties at potential risk. For example, third parties may be ex-
posed to a contagious disease when an infected individual thwarts or
refuses a public-health intervention. Or third parties may be threat-
ened with violence when a mentally ill and dangerous individual
avoids, or rejects, mental-health treatment. Legal measures available
for protecting third parties from the damaging consequences of an-
34 See, e.g., Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1978), affd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980) (expressing that the individual's right to
refuse medical treatment is balanced against the state's interest in "the preservation of
life[, the n]eed to protect innocent third parties[, the d]uty to prevent suicide[,] ...
[and the duty to] help maintain the ethical integrity of medical practice").
35 A fourth item routinely included in the litany of state interests is the pre-
vention of suicide, which is inapposite here.
36 While the discussion of this interest may focus on preservation of a single
identifiable life in a treatment-refusal case, the societal interest in preservation of life
extends beyond the individual and embraces human life in general.
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other's exercise of autonomy include: court orders to override refusals
of treatment, public health acts to implement quarantines, and public
or private attempts to cause the involuntary civil commitment of dan-
gerous individuals. Each of these measures interferes with, or may
even completely override, an individual's exercise of autonomy.
As reflected in case law and statutes, the interest in safeguarding
the ethical integrity of the medical profession is primarily the interest
securing a physician's right to "just say no" when asked to cooperate
in an activity she finds ethically repugnant. Such an activity need not
be illegal. For example, performing an abortion, or discontinuing life-
sustaining treatment are activities a physician might shun. Even
where an activity is of questionable legality, for instance, participation
in active euthanasia, a physician's "conscience" objection furnishes an
independent basis for her unwillingness to become involved. Nothing
suggested here, however, conflicts with the societal interest in safe-
guarding the medical profession's ethical integrity. A trainee who is
genuinely ethically offended should simply not partake in the educa-
tional activity. But if, as I suspect, flawed legal reasoning is the real
source of the trend toward condemning these activities, the societal
interest in preserving the medical profession's ethical integrity is not
even pertinent, let alone in any jeopardy.
3. Beyond the Balancing Test
Health-care professionals often make and carry out decisions
beneficial to one patient at the expense of another, and no criticism of
those actions should be inferred from this observation. Collectively,
whether consciously or not, we have put health-care providers in this
position. We expect them, indeed, we rely on them to decide who is
sacrificed and who is saved.
In some situations, we label their actions "triage" and understand
that necessity drives those actions. Too few resources are available to
meet too great a need. So the most salvageable of the critically in-
jured come first when time, provisions, and personnel are in short
supply. Moreover, when the intensive-care unit is full and a newly
admitted, very sick patient needs an intensive-care bed, someone must
be moved to a lower level of care. A physician, or sometimes a nurse,
will choose the someone.
In other situations, we label the process "allocation of resources,"
where, for example, we acknowledge that more people need liver
transplants than there are suitable livers to go around. Medical criteria
identify who among the patients on the waiting list will receive the
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next available liver. In addition, we facilitate medical research using
patients enrolled as subjects without their knowledge or consent.37
Inherent in any medical research study is a lack of knowledge about
whether participation will help its subjects; it may be that future pa-
tients turn out to be the only beneficiaries. Finally, we support the
trend toward identification and use of "cost effective" treatments, by
which we hope to produce a collective benefit despite the possible
detriment to isolated individuals.
All of this nonconsensual activity, undertaken by health-care pro-
fessionals at our behest, affects living, vulnerable people. To treat the
interests of the newly dead as sacrosanct and entitled to absolute pro-
tection, when the interests of those currently alive are not so treated, is
absurd.
Il. A MODEST PROPOSAL ENCOURAGING
APPROPRIATE USE OF EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES
A. The Proposal
Minimally invasive educational practices using newly dead bodies
are not illegal, and should not be made illegal. Performing them de-
fensively, or with subterfuge, which simply reinforces the impression
that they are "wrong," is ill-advised.
In a couple of decades, the hopeful estimate of the amount of time
it will take for technology to make the issue moot, the need for these
activities may be obviated by the widespread availability of virtual
reality programs, and sufficiently sophisticated and affordable manne-
quins. If so, then this issue will simply go away. In the meantime,
ensuring that professionals continue to be well prepared is of para-
mount importance. My narrow and modest proposal, then, is to say
"yes!" to the question posed at the beginning of this article, with the
understanding that the population of eligible teaching subjects is lim-
ited by the terms of the anecdote, as explained in greater detail below.
Not all people who seek health care in emergency-room settings
do so because their need is critical, or even urgent. Sometimes people
visit an emergency room because they feel ill and have no other place
to go. This article does not encompass those folks, however. My use
of the term Emergency Care is intended to capture two essential as-
pects of certain health-care services: that they are 1) provided in the
emergency room, and 2) required to treat or stabilize a condition that
" See 21 C.F.R. § 50.24 (2007) (allowing an "[e]xception from informed
consent requirements for emergency research").
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poses an imminent risk of death or significant disability if not at-
tended to immediately. Under this definition, the patient described in
the anecdote at the beginning of this article received Emergency Care.
In contrast, a person with a cough and fever who comes to the emer-
gency room on Saturday night rather than wait for his physician's
office to open on Monday morning does not receive Emergency Care
as discussed in this article, even if an emergency-room physician di-
agnoses his bronchitis and prescribes treatment.
The rationales may be summarized quickly. As discussed in Part
II above, the analogy to consent requirements for organ procurement
is inapt, loved ones' legitimate interests can be fully protected, and in
the unlikely event that autonomy survives death, it must yield to the
superior interests of others who are still alive. Finally, as I explore in
detail below, Emergency Care is different from care provided in other
circumstances.
This proposal embraces only those "newly dead" bodies that to all
reasonable appearances have not been the victims of violent crimes,
so that there are no death investigation implications, and about which
no ambiguity exists concerning the diagnosis of death, so that no need
exists to confirm that all neurological diagnostic criteria are met. And
all who die in, or who are dead on arrival at the emergency room
should be included in this population. This means that neither the
decedent, nor the decedent's next-of-kin can, or should be given the
chance to opt out.
B. Why Emergency Care?
Why should Emergency Care cases supply the bodies for this
educational objective? Several significant attributes of Emergency
Care suggest justifications. Emergency care is different. Anyone and
everyone - indigent or wealthy, insured or uninsured, male or female,
young or old, chronically ill or generally healthy, privileged or de-
prived - can end up in the emergency room. This factor alone goes
far toward ensuring that the "selection of subjects is equitable,' 38 a
criterion important to maintaining confidence that no group bears a
disproportionate share of this burden.
Emergency Care rescues, or offers hope of rescue, to those facing
dire and immediate threats because of trauma, or sudden serious ill-
ness. It does not prevent, or offer hope of prevention, which distin-
guishes it from primary health care services. Emergency Care is, at
least theoretically, available to all without regard to source of pay-
38 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (a)(3) (2006) (stating one of several criteria for ap-
proval of research on living human subjects).
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ment, or indeed, ability to pay. For many years, the law has treated
Emergency Care as though it is special and ought to be accessible to
those in need. Courts, legislatures, and regulatory agencies have all
used their lawmaking power and authority to encourage, and even
force, the ready availability of Emergency Care.
1. Courts and Emergency Care: Tort Liability
Among the criteria a plaintiff pursuing a negligence claim must
establish is that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of reasonable
care. The general principle governing questions of duty is that by
undertaking an activity, one undertakes a duty of reasonable care to-
ward those who are reasonably foreseeably affected by that activity.
This standard readily allows for satisfaction of the duty criterion when
applied in many health-care negligence cases. The reason is that the
defendant, whether a professional or an institution, will have under-
taken to diagnose or treat the patient/plaintiff, thereby undertaking a
duty of reasonable care toward him. In such cases, the alleged act of
negligence or malpractice that prompts the lawsuit will have occurred
after establishment of the treatment relationship. Moreover, whether
an act of negligence or malpractice actually took place, that is,
whether there was a breach of a recognized duty, is generally much
more hotly debated by the parties than the question whether a duty
existed in the first place. The same generalization cannot be made
about negligence claims arising out of emergency-room incidents. In
those cases, the injury is just as likely to result from a failure to pro-
vide treatment as from an affirmative act of negligence or malpractice.
This means that two of the legal criteria a plaintiff pursuing such a
negligence claim must establish, the existence of a duty of reasonable
care and the failure to fulfill that duty, revolve around the same event
-- the failure to provide any treatment at all. But only if a duty of
reasonable care exists in the first place could the failure to provide
treatment constitute actionable negligence. Without a duty of reason-
able care, the failure to provide treatment, even if in some sense "un-
reasonable, ' 39 would not constitute actionable negligence. In short,
the plaintiff in such a situation is not able to rely on a preexisting pro-
vider-patient relationship as the predicate for a finding that the defen-
dant owed him a duty of care.
39 For example, the failure to provide treatment may be "unreasonable" if
providing treatment would conform to the standard of care and would not be unduly
burdensome.
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At least since the landmark decision in Wilmington General Hos-
pital v. Manlove,4° however, courts have treated denials of emer-
gency-room treatment differently for purposes of duty analysis. Al-
though the Manlove court acknowledged that a hospital "is under no
legal obligation to the public to maintain an emergency ward,'1 it
made clear that a hospital's refusal to provide emergency care when a
patient has relied on its "well-established custom" to render such aid,
may form the basis for negligence liability. According to this line of
reasoning, an institution undertakes such action by operating an emer-
gency room, thereby inviting those in need of emergency care to rely
on that undertaking by seeking treatment. Once the relying patient
seeks treatment, the duty criterion of negligence law is fulfilled, so
that the institution operating the emergency room has assumed a duty
of reasonable care toward the patient. This approach, rooted in
Manlove, and developed more fully in later cases, provides someone
injured by a mere denial of emergency care a credible basis for a
claim. The specter of such liability, along with the legislative man-
dates discussed below, has created the incentive for institutions to
change certain practices so that they also treat emergency care differ-
ently.
2. State Legislatures and Emergency Care: Licensing Statutes
Hospitals, like individual health-care professionals, must be li-
censed by the states in which they provide health care, and state legis-
latures often attach conditions to the procurement and maintenance of
health-care providers' licenses.42 Commonly included among such
conditions in hospital licensing statutes are provisions creating and
defining hospitals' emergency-care obligations. A hospital that runs
afoul of such provisions may find itself in trouble with the agency that
governs its licensure and operations. A hospital that runs afoul of
such provisions and causes personal injury in doing so may find itself
facing a plaintiff armed not only with a common-law negligence
claim, but also with a claim based on the violation of a statute in-
tended to protect individuals like him from precisely the sort of harm
he sustained. The Arizona Supreme Court, for example, bolstered the
Manlove common-law analysis with the familiar tort law adoption of a
statutory violation to allow the imposition of liability on institutions
40 174 A.2d 135 (Del. 1961).
41 Id. at 139 (emphasis added).
42 E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1317 (West 2000); N.Y. PuB.
HEALTH LAW § 2805-b(2) (McKinney 2007).
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whose refusals of emergency care cause physical harm to specific
43patients.
3. Congress and Emergency Care: EMTALA, the "Anti-Dumping"
Statute
Congress, not to be excluded from the recognition that emergency
care is different, included provisions in the Emergency Medical
Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) of 1985.44 Congress's goal,
discouraging private hospitals from "dumping" indigent patients, co-
incided with state legislatures' goals. But EMTALA reaches well
beyond that goal. Because EMTALA creates an obligation imple-
mented and enforced as a "condition of participation" in the Medicare
program, it is both potent and comprehensive. EMTALA's potency
lies in its link to Medicare: eligibility to receive Medicare payments is
essential to the financial survival of most hospitals in the United
States. The ultimate sanction for an institution that fails to comply
with Medicare's conditions of participation is exclusion from the
Medicare program, and accordingly, a loss of Medicare revenue.
EMTALA's comprehensiveness lies in its choice of beneficiaries: all
who come to the emergency room are protected by EMTALA's re-
quirements, and anyone injured by a violation of EMTALA may pur-
sue a private claim for relief on that basis. Despite the source of the
EMTALA rule and the impetus for enacting it, the injured party need
not be a Medicare beneficiary, or an indigent or uninsured individual.
45
4. So: Why Emergency Care?
The multifaceted effort to ensure access to Emergency Care both
derives from, and illustrates a broadly supported view that emergency
care is different; that in a crisis posing an imminent threat of death or
serious injury, characteristics that otherwise distinguish us from one
another become insignificant because of the exigent circumstances.
We all benefit from this view - because when we come to the emer-
gency room, we may be unconscious, unaccompanied, unidentified, or
otherwise unable to help ourselves. It is precisely when we are at our
most vulnerable that our need will be greatest. None of us knows
43 Guerrero v. Copper Queen Hosp., 537 P.2d 1329, 1331 (Ariz. 1975).
44See ScoTr BECKER, HEALTH CARE LAW: A PRACTICAL GUIDE §
21.01 (2)(b) (2d ed. 1998) (offering an overview of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA)).
45 The commentary about EMTALA is voluminous. For a concise summary
of the statute's requirements, see id. § 21.01(2)(c).
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when, or whether, we will find ourselves in such circumstances, but
we all know that the law puts us on an equal footing with our peers
should the worst happen.
We all benefit, and therefore we should all have equal opportunity
to bear a small part of the burden. We should all have an equal
chance to participate in the educational activities by which the next
generation of professionals learns the skills to treat the next generation
of the ill and injured. Making everyone eligible to help in bearing this
burden, with continued regard for the death-investigation concerns
surrounding crimes, eliminates the potential for maldistribution of
burden that has been observed in other contexts, where the poor or
uninsured have been the principal source of research or teaching sub-
jects.46 This means that neither the decedent nor the decedent's next-
of-kin can, or should be given the chance to opt out. The quid pro
quo for coming to the emergency room, taking advantage of the haven
and rescue it may offer in a crisis, is to cooperate in furthering the
mission of the institution that makes the potential rescue possible, at
least when that cooperation cannot cause harm.
C. Guidelines
Institutional or professional guidelines to govern these practices
should incorporate a spirit of respect for subjects, and maintain a fo-
cus on educational goals. Three principles seem critical to setting
appropriate boundaries.
1. Limit Practice Opportunities to Those Who Must Develop
Particular Skills.
A physician pursuing a pediatric residency must compile a skill
set different from that of an aspiring dermatologist or a future special-
ist in emergency medicine. Teach only those who need to learn; all
physicians need not be able to perform a periocardiocentesis, or insert
a central venous line. Indeed, a nurse training to practice as a certified
registered nurse anesthetist has a greater need than many physicians to
become proficient at inserting central venous lines.
46 See Wilson, supra note 14, at 248-49 & nn.53-60.
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2. Limit Practice Opportunities to Occasions When a Preceptor or
other Skilled Teacher is Available
to Supervise and Critique the Novice.
While opportunities should not be squandered, neither should they
be abused. A novice who attempts to perform a procedure without
being observed by, and receiving prompt feedback from, a skilled
preceptor is just as likely to form the basis for a bad practice as to
learn how to perform a procedure properly.
3. Limit Practice Opportunities to Those Already Trained on Manne-
quins, Human Performance Simulators, or Virtual Reality Simulators.
Again, while opportunities should not be squandered, neither
should they be abused. Novices should always undergo appropriate
classroom and simulation training prior to attempting a procedure
using a human body, living or dead.
Additional considerations may help to create sensible and toler-
able guidelines, several of which are suggested below. Adhering to
any of them will reduce the available educational opportunities but
will also minimize the invasion perceived by some objectors. First,
limit practice opportunities to replication of procedures performed
during the attempt to resuscitate or otherwise rescue the subject. For
example, only if a central venous line was inserted during the treat-
ment phase should a novice practice such an insertion. Second, limit
practice opportunities to one attempt each at whatever procedures are
practiced. Next, limit practice opportunities to one novice for each
newly dead body. Last, limit practice opportunities to a specific
amount of time, so as to ensure an absolute time limit between the
declaration of death and the cessation of post-mortem practice proce-
dures.
CONCLUSION
Every medical professional who will ever perform a procedure on
a human being must perform each procedure a "first time." Using a
newly dead body for such an initial performance cannot do it any
harm. Accordingly, routine use of newly dead bodies for teaching
novices helps to ensure conformity with the age-old "first" principle
of medical ethics: "First, do no harm."

